E-Democracy and the European Public Sphere by Hennen, L.
Chapter 3
E-Democracy and the European Public
Sphere
Leonhard Hennen
Abstract The chapter starts with an outline of outstanding recent contributions to
the discussion of the EU democratic deficit and the so-called “no demos” problem
and the debate about European citizenship and European identity—mainly in the
light of insights from the EU crisis. This is followed by reflections on the recent
discussion on the state of the mass media-based European public sphere. Finally, the
author discusses the state of research on the Internet’s capacity to support the
emergence of a (renewed) public sphere, with a focus on options for political actors
to use the Internet for communication and campaigning, on the related establishment
of segmented issue-related publics as well as on social media and its two-faced
character as an enabler as well as a distorting factor of the public sphere. The author
is sceptic about the capacities of Internet-based political communication to develop
into a supranational (European) public sphere. It rather establishes a network of a
multitude of discursive processes aimed at opinion formation at various levels and
on various issues. The potential of online communication to increase the responsive-
ness of political institutions so far is set into practice insufficiently. Online media are
increasingly used in a vertical and scarcely in a horizontal or interactive manner of
communication.
3.1 Introduction
The motives and driving forces of e-democracy are manifold. However, at the centre
of all the efforts of (not only but in particular) the European Union (EU) to apply
e-democracy and e-participation tools is the particular problem that the EU (and
other transnational political bodies) has to directly refer and relate to a specific
constituency, causing problems of legitimising its policy. The so-called “democratic
deficit” of the EU institutions, caused by its indirect legitimisation by the European
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constituency, is closely connected to the problem of European citizenship. Besides
the objective formal rights of citizens (as enacted in the Treaty of the European
Union), democratic legitimisation needs, as its backbone, the joint commitment and
feeling of belonging of citizens to a community. This cultural fundament historically
emerged or co-developed with the nation state, so that national democratic systems
can rely to some degree on a general overarching solidarity of citizens that allows for
conflict and dissent on particular political issues, and the acceptance of majority
decisions by those members of the constituency that disagree. To what extent the
European Union can rely on a European “demos” in this regard is a matter of
contention. The same applies for the European public sphere as a space of societal
debate and political exchange, which at the same time controls the European
institutions’ policies and informs them about and feeds them with society’s expec-
tations, demands and interests. Public opinion forming and exchange about
European politics almost exclusively takes place in nationally organised mass
media publics, and in this respect there obviously is no specific overarching
trans-European public sphere. Trans-European media (TV or press) have a marginal
relevance, and national mass media—due to, among other things, language prob-
lems—offer no or only weak options for trans- or inter-European exchange across
borders (Lindner et al. 2016). This problem has been the core motivation for all
attempts of the European Commission (EC) throughout its history to explore and
invest in new options for political communication via means of new media and
especially the Internet.
In a tour d’horizon of the history of the European Commission’s communication
strategies, Lodge and Sarikakis (2013) regard this as a long and winding road of
attempts to establish a European public sphere, which have often been confused with
goals such as mobilising electoral support, or strategies of positioning the EU in
national media. Later, with the “Plan D for Democracy, Dialogue and Debate” (see
Lindner et al. 2016), the strategies for mediating a European public sphere adopted
the goal of including the European citizen directly in political discourse by means of
(online) public consultation, and more recently, by establishing the European Citizen
Initiative, by means of which citizens can invite the EC to put forward proposals on
EU policy issues supported by a sufficient quorum of citizens from all over Europe.
The relevance of e-participation tools has also been highlighted in the EC’s action
plan on e-governance 2010–2015 (EC 2010) in order to “. . . improve the ability of
people to have their voice heard and make suggestions for policy actions in the
Member States and the European Union as a whole” (EC 2010: 8). The undeniable
fact that nowadays political communication is to a great extent taking place via
Internet websites, blogs and in social media puts to the fore speculations and hopes
that the lack of a mass media in the European public sphere will find a remedy in the
emergence of a “networked” European public sphere. The relevance of expectations
and hopes that the Internet has the power to at least support public debate on
European issues, in a way that also helps to foster a European identity among
European citizens, is underlined by the fact that it is believed by many that the
EU’s democratic deficit will not find “redress” as long as no European-wide public
sphere emerges (Hoffmann and Monaghan 2011).
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3.2 The Democratic Deficit of the European Union
The focus of the following section will be the problem of the European public sphere
and the role of new media and Internet communication in contributing to making a
European public sphere emerge, or working as a proxy for a so far missing mass-
mediated European public sphere. The body of literature on the European demo-
cratic deficit, on the state of a European public sphere, and about the option for an “e-
Public” in Europe has grown in recent years. The discussion of this body of research
and scholarly debate will necessarily have to find a focus. We mainly draw here on
literature dealing explicitly with the European context (we refer to the more general
literature on problems of transnational publics in general where necessary). It cannot
come as a surprise that the issues of the European democratic deficit, of European
identity and citizenship as well as of the European public sphere come into specific
perspective with regard to the recent symptoms of a crisis of the EU. The conse-
quences of the legitimation or democratic deficit of EU politics has been drastically
revealed by increasing EU-scepticism during the recent years of financial and
sovereign debt crisis, followed by fierce recession in some of the weaker economies
of Member States, the discussion about the bailout of Greece and in the British
referendum showing a small majority of voters opting for the “Brexit”. Thus, the
effect and reflection of these recent developments in scholarly debates and research
will be the focus of this section. The section starts with an outline of outstanding
recent contributions to the discussion of the EU democratic deficit and the so-called
“no demos” problem and the debate about European citizenship and European
identity—mainly in the light of insights from the EU crisis. This will be followed
by an outline of the recent discussion on the state of the mass media-based European
public sphere, for which the recent EU crisis also is of some relevance. Finally, the
chapter will discuss the state of research on the Internet’s capacity to support the
emergence of a (renewed) public sphere. Here we focus on options for political
actors to use the Internet for communication and campaigning and the related
establishment of segmented issue-related publics, as well as on social media and
its two-faced character as an enabler as well as a distorting factor of the public
sphere.
3.2.1 Legitimisation of EU Politics in Times of Crisis
Even with direct parliamentary European elections and after fostering the initiative
and controlling rights of the European Parliament, the EU is still regarded by
many—including European policymakers—to suffer from what has been coined a
“democratic deficit” (Grimm 1995). This is due to the fact that the EC, with its
growing competences as a European government, has no direct liability to European
citizens, but is enacted and controlled by a multilevel system of policymaking, as a
rather indirect mode of democracy. At the same time, the EU acts as a body
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representing European citizens, and functions as “. . . a uniquely large and complex
body of specialized decision-making, often operating outside the control of formal-
ized and territorially bound systems of representative democracy” (Michailidou and
Trenz 2013: 260).
In a summary of the democratic deficit discussion and with a view to the current
EU crisis and widespread criticism of the EU institutions’ crisis management,
Habermas (2015: 547) refers to the term by noting an “increasing distance separating
the decision-making processes of EU-authorities from the political will formation of
European citizens in their respective national arenas”. Thus, the “democratic deficit”
of the EU institutions continues to be a central feature of discussions about the future
and the further development of the European Union. It becomes more relevant with
the obvious problems of how to arrive at an integrated widely accepted European
solution with regard to problems such as the financial crisis or the EU refugee policy.
The central question is then, to what extent can the European institutions evolve into
a European government with extended responsibilities (particularly with regard to
social welfare and transfer politics), and how can this European government be
democratically legitimised? Or is it unrealistic to expect this because the given
diversity of Europe in terms of political culture, economic power and development
of social welfare cannot simply be overcome by democratic structural reforms
(e.g. strengthening the European Parliament and a European government elected
by the Parliament)?
In a recent seminal dispute between public intellectuals about the future of
Europe, both positions are prominent: On the one hand, it is held that there is a
need to expand EU competences and that this has to (and can) be done by
democratising the EU political system, in order to overcome the democratic deficit
as well as the symptoms of the EU crisis (Habermas 2014a, b, 2015; Offe 2013a, b).
On the other hand, there is the notion that it is the crisis itself which makes it obvious
that further integration of Europe, as well as a way out of the legitimisation crisis by
giving more competences to Brussels, is not an option (Scharpf 2014, 2015; Streeck
2013, 2015). Both positions hold that EU politics, as executed by the European
Commission and the European Council, lacks democratic legitimation and
responsiveness to the European citizenry. However, while from the one perspective
(Scharpf, Streeck) this leads to the demand of restricting the competences of the EU
to the advantages of national governments, keeping the EU in the status of a
“regulatory state” (Majone 1996; see Lindner et al. 2016), from the other perspective
(Habermas, Offe) this leads to demands of expanding the competences of the Union
at the costs of national governments and at the same time strengthening the demo-
cratic legitimation of the European institutions by making them subject to direct
elections and control by the European citizenry.
Especially, the Euro crisis has led to vivid debates about the legitimacy of the EU
institutions’ policy, the dominance of the European Central Bank (ECB) over the
Parliament and the relation between national and European sovereigns, in the
context of a discussion about EU fiscal policy, which cannot be discussed in detail
here (see contributions in de Witte et al. 2013; see also Streeck 2015). It is, however,
striking with regard to the Euro crisis that for both positions held with regard to the
50 L. Hennen
right fiscal policy, the democratic deficit “strikes back”. Those who support the
austerity and neoliberal programme of forcing Greece into a process of lowering the
level of social welfare are confronted with the accusation that technocratic insti-
tutions are overruling democratically legitimised governments in Member States
without themselves being backed up by democratic legitimisation. For those in
favour of reacting to the crisis by installing a European fiscal and social policy
(including a fiscal union), backing by a transnational solidarity consensus is needed,
but is not in sight, given the apparently even deeper separation of the EU citizenry
and the public sphere by predominant national interests.
Fritz W. Scharpf’s (1999) influential distinction between input and output legit-
imacy helps to understand the particular relevance of the democratic deficit in times
of crisis. Due to their transnational character, the EU institutions’ legitimisation
cannot be rooted in strong channels of information from citizens to the EC (input
legitimacy) and thus must rely on legitimising its policies by the quality of its output,
i.e. its decisions and regulations being in the best interests of, and thus supported by,
the citizenry. The fact that in the latter respect the means of the EU institutions are
also restricted has a special bearing in times of crisis. The missing input legitimacy
becomes all the more problematic the weaker output legitimacy becomes, with
apparent difficulties in establishing a consensus on a European way out of the fiscal
crisis, or a joint European policy to solve the refugee problem. In a situation where
strong decisions have to be taken at the EU level (beyond national interests), input
legitimacy is urgently needed. For this reason, some regard a rearrangement of the
EU institutional setting to be necessary. In order to (re)establish the bridge between
the European citizenry and the European political elites, a strong European Parlia-
ment is needed. This implies a European electoral contestation between European
(not nationally defined) political parties, on the basis of which the European Com-
mission would be transformed into a government which is accountable to the
Parliament representing the European citizenry. Offe (2013a), regarding the growing
competence of institutions like the ECB, considers it to be detrimental to the project
of European integration that those institutions which are “farthest remote from
democratic accountability” have the “greatest impact on daily life of people”. He
regards this to have developed into a “deep divorce between politics and policy” at
the European level. Politics is based on often populist national mass politics with
limited implications for the lives of people, whereas policymaking becomes an elitist
matter that “has no roots in, no links to nor legitimation through politics” (Offe
2013a: 610). Also, in Habermas’ view the democratic deficit has deepened in the
course of establishing the Fiscal Compact and the European Stability Mechanism,
because the European Parliament alone did not benefit from the increase of compe-
tences of the EU institutions (Habermas 2015: 551).
As a way out of the democratic deficit as well as of the crisis of EU integration,
Habermas (2015)—despite the current climate against it—considers far-reaching
institutional reform to be necessary. Due to the transnational character of the
European Union, the democratic legitimisation of the institutions has to be backed
up by a double “sovereign”, represented in two chambers: on the one side the
Parliament (citizenry) and on the other side the European Council, which he
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would like to see as the second legislative “leg” alongside the Parliament,
representing as a second sovereign the European Member States and their peoples
(“House of States”). He regards this to be the way to take account of both the
transnational character of the European Union and European citizens’ interests in
having their ways of living and wealth protected by their national governments. This
is in line with the conceptualisation of “transnational” democracy in Articles 9–12 of
the Lisbon Treaty (Bogdandy 2012). The concept of “people” is reserved for the
nation state, whereas individual citizenship (with individual political rights) is seen
as the foundation of democratic legitimacy of the European Union.
On the other hand, it is argued that the conditions for expanding the competences
of the European Parliament and deepening integration are not given. The crisis,
requiring strong decisions on redistribution of resources, which have to be taken
according to the majority rule, reveals that European solidarity is weak. The crisis
has obviously brought about a reorientation towards national interests. As Offe
(2013b: 75) puts it: the bank crisis has been transformed into a crisis of state finances
(via the obligations that have been taken over by national governments to save the
banks), which has turned out to cause a crisis of European integration, where rich
countries force poorer countries into an austerity policy in order to re-establish trust
in the financial industry. This has widely led to “a renationalization of solidarity
horizons” in the European Union (Renationalisierung der Solidaritätshorizonte).
Thus, what is needed for institutional reform and a further integration of the EU is
lacking more now than ever before (Scharpf 2014; Streeck 2015). More generally, it
is believed that the heterogeneity of Europe with regard to local, regional and
national ways of living and economies only allows for a democratic European
constitution that acknowledges these differences by way of far-reaching autonomy
rights, which, with regard to financial constitutional questions, implies low mutual
obligations of financial solidarity among partners (Streeck 2013).
Thus, beyond any debates of the actual problems of European policymaking, the
discussion points to the more fundamental problems of European citizenship and the
European public sphere. It can be argued that especially in times of crisis, it would be
necessary to legitimise far-reaching decisions that will deeply influence living
conditions in the European Member States through a vivid process of deliberation
about pro and cons, needs, demands and duties. This, however, appears to have even
less chance of being fostered, precisely due to the crisis mechanism that leads to
focusing on national interests (Scharpf 2014; Streeck 2015).
Is there enough homogeneity and a European citizenship that can motivate
European integration, and is there a European public sphere that can provide the
fundaments for joint democratically legitimised European political action? In the
following, we will first discuss the question of the European “demos” and then turn
to actual research on the state of the European Public sphere.
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3.2.2 “No Demos”? European Identity and Citizenship
It has always been a major pillar of the legitimisation of the European integration
project that it will bring about increasing prosperity and general welfare through
stimulating economic growth. Thus, it cannot come as a surprise that in an economic
situation causing obvious difficulties in achieving consensus about common solu-
tions at the European level, citizens expect their national governments to look at
national economies first and protect them against a loss in welfare. Accordingly,
based on Eurobarometer data, a study of the average European’s identification with
Europe as a part of their identity as citizens showed that “a sense of being European”
dropped significantly in many European countries during the financial crisis in the
period of 2005–2010. The general decrease in identification with Europe was
strongest in those countries which suffered most in terms of decrease of per capita
GDP or increase in unemployment as a result of the recession caused by the financial
crisis, namely, the Baltic states, Great Britain, Italy, Ireland, France and Greece
(Polyakova and Fligstein 2016).
It is this observation of weak European solidarity and the predominance of
national perspectives that feeds the so-called “no demos” discussion among scholars
of European politics. The debate dates back to the 1990s and starts from the notion
that in order to work, democracy needs to be rooted in a “demos”, a political
(as opposed to an ethnic) community which is rooted in “a strong sense of commu-
nity and loyalty among a political group”—this being, as it were, the socio-cultural
prerequisite of democracy (Risse 2014: 1207). The assumption that a “demos” of
this kind does not exist at the European level, but only at the national level, and that
the different “demoi” of the Member States do not form a meta-national demos,
implies that democracy at the transnational level cannot (and must not) be based on
input legitimacy, but mainly on the quality of the output of the political system.
Authors such as Scharpf (see above) hold that due to the heterogeneity (cultural as
well as economic) of living conditions in the Member States, there is no basic
consensus—or subjectively felt citizenship—which could function as a cultural
backbone holding the community together against conflictive majority decisions in
the (reformed) European Union. The acknowledgement of majority decisions that
might be against their own interests (at least until the next elections) can only be
expected on the grounds of an implicit cultural consensus based on shared
citizenship.
In other words, no pre-political community exists for integration at the European
level that is comparable to integration at the level of the nation state. Europe is not a
nation state but can be thought of as a “mixed commonwealth”, in which national
and supranational identities coexist with each other. Europe “. . . possesses aspects of
a nation, but it is a rather watered-down version of it [. . .]. It relies on a body of
treaties that provides a framework of ‘constitutionality’ but without a constitution. It
offers membership, but subordinated to the stronger Member State form. Its mem-
bers are related, but with a link much weaker than that of ordinary polities. Such a
link is based on some commonalities—which ground a very vague shared political
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identity among its members, but not comparable with political identities at nation
state level” (Lobeira 2012: 516).
This type of observation is not contested by those who are optimistic about the
possibility of European citizenship; however, they hold that it neglects the specific
character of transnational compared to national citizenship (Habermas 2015).
Instead, it is argued that European democracy is not in need of a “demos” in terms
of a cultural (national) community, but that European citizens’ commitment to the
fundaments of the European political constitution is sufficient to establish a new
form of “citizenship”. This “constitutional patriotism”, together with a well-
functioning European democracy, would be sufficient as a solidarity fundament
for the European Union (see also Lindner et al. 2016).
With the current conflicting mode of policymaking in the EU, this position is
confronted with new scepticism. A prominent observer from abroad, the US philos-
opher and communitarian thinker Amitai Etzioni (2013), considers neither the
democratic deficit nor a weakness of the European political system to be Europe’s
current main problem. From his perspective, what proves to be crucial in this crisis is
what he calls the “communitarian deficit”, i.e. the lack of a post-national sense of
community or European citizenship: “The insufficient sharing of values and bonds—
not the poor representative mechanisms—is a major cause of alienation from
Brussels’ and limits the normative commitment to make sacrifices for the common
good” (Etzioni 2013: 312). He holds that there needs to be more than constitutional
patriotism to establish enough solidarity to solve the problems of economic dispar-
ities among the European Member States: “Membership in a more interdependent
EU involves not just rights but burdensome duties (such as bailing out the Greeks)
that will only be voluntarily met if citizens feel the value of communal obligation to
those beyond their national borders” (Etzioni 2013: 315).
Contrary to this communitarian view, it is believed that European citizenship
cannot be understood according to national citizenship coupled with cultural identity
as it emerged with the constitution of the nation state in early modernity. Trans-
national identity or citizenship and the related sense of belonging “. . . involves starting
from a different standpoint, one that sees belonging as an identity ‘in the making’
and that imagines it to be ‘deterritorialised’ and set in a transnational dimension”
(Scalise 2014: 52). Indeed, there are at least weak indications from some qualitative
research that a “mixed identity” can be found in Europe. Based on interviews with a
group of 40 people from a local community in Italy, Scalise (2014) undertook to
reconstruct the narratives about Europe that emerge and are shared among “average”
European citizens, and highlights this specific type of identity and citizenship in the
following way: “Different narratives of Europe are shared among Europeans:
stories related to the cultural and historical roots of the continent, institutional
and ‘official’ narratives of the EU, biographical stories weaved together with
collective memories. Multi-level stories, a mixture of values and references coming
from the local and national heritage and linked to the European post-national plot.
In the broad range of the narratives which have emerged, the influence of the local
context, where the stories originate, can always be identified. The stories of Europe
are embedded in the regional territories. [. . .] There is a dynamic relation between
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the local, national, supranational and transnational dimensions. These levels inter-
act in the European identity construction process” (Scalise 2014: 59).
To what extent this can be regarded as an indication of a general European
identity is of course an open question and has to be confirmed by much broader
research approaches. Beyond this, however, proponents of a further integration of
the EU base their cautionary optimism with regard to the “Europeanisation of
European citizens” in the further development of the discourse about Europe and,
thus, in the further development of the European public sphere (see the next section).
From this perspective the development of European identity and solidarity depends
on the chances and opportunities to discuss and define what is in the common
European interest via a common European political discourse. For this—and the
democratic deficit comes into perspective again—it is necessary for the European
Parliament to function as a European public space, which foremost implies that
societal interests and political debate on the “common good” are not organised
alongside national party lines but are fostered by European (transnational) party
groups (Habermas 2014a: 94). A European party system is a precondition for
overcoming the national restriction of perspectives and would prepare the ground
for a will formation at the European level, i.e. in the light of shared (and not
nationally divided) normative principles of social justice, and with regard to shared
assessments of the problems at stake and the way out (Offe 2013a: 606 f.). The
constitution of the EU generally has the effect that European citizens in their national
contexts are not confronted with alternatives of European policies to be discussed
publicly, but are just affected by the results of EU policies decided on by the EC and
the Council of Ministers. From this perspective, identity is not culturally given
(as supposed by a communitarian perspective; see Etzioni, above), but evolves in
a political process. In this way, citizenship must (and can) emerge out of debates and
conflicts about the public good—as was the case for national identities in the
conflictual emergence of the nation state (Habermas 2015). Thus, it is important to
what extent the EU polity allows for a vivid political discourse among citizens. From
this perspective, it clearly makes a difference whether the citizenry is consulted by
means of e-participation methods (see below), or to what extent institutional inno-
vations, like the European Citizen Initiative, add to the set of citizens’ rights by
giving citizens a voice in lawmaking (Ene and Micu 2013).
3.2.3 Politicisation of Europe and European Citizenship
In this respect the contestation of European issues in the context of the fiscal or
refugee crisis is regarded by many as not necessarily an indication of disintegration,
but as an indication of the Europeanisation of politics. Scholars of European politics
thus speak of a “politicisation of the European integration” with positive conno-
tations, meaning that there is an observable tendency to publicly address the issues and
problems of European multi-level democracy (Wendler 2012; de Wilde and Zürn
2012; Hooghe and Marks 2008). The contestation of European integration has for
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around a decade been observed to be based in conflicts around cultural identity
(Hooghe and Marks 2008; Kriesi et al. 2007), in the lack of compatibility between
national and supranational institutions (Schmidt 2008) and in resource and distribu-
tion conflicts in the context of regulation of the European market (Hix 2009; Majone
2002). The so-called “permissive consensus”, characterised by wide implicit
EU-scepticism, but where citizens do not engage with EU issues and leave the playing
field to political elite with the effect of the de-thematisation of Europe in national
public spheres, has come to an end. Underlying conflicts have now come to the fore
and made Europe a public issue (Hooghe and Marks 2008).
Politicisation of European integration is then regarded as being driven by an
expanding public discourse that provides for transparency of decision-making,
includes civil society and provides for critical feedback to decision-makers, thus
having a “democratising function”. The contestation of Europe in the actual crisis is
also regarded as being a sign of a functioning Europeanised public sphere with a
potential for democratic reform of the European polity (Statham and Trenz 2012,
2015). However, insofar as this reform does not take place, the weakness of the EU
institutional system will be further exposed in the public sphere, which will foster
scepticism even further (ibid.)
Despite the obvious fact that politicisation of the issue of European integration in
the Euro crisis is accompanied by national interests and the dominance of national
stereotypes in national public debates, many observers (Risse 2015c; Hutter and
Grande 2012; Rauh 2013) hold that politicisation, when coupled with an opening of
national public spheres in terms of Europeanisation (see below), can be regarded as
an indicator of increased awareness of the relevance of Europe for Europeans. It
depends on the framing of EU issues whether or not the growing politicisation of EU
affairs increases the sense of community in Europe. In this respect, it is also held that
politicisation of European integration is clearly induced by the growing authority of
the European institutions since the 1980s. It is therefore believed that it is decisive to
actively address and deal with the problem of the growing authority of the EU
institutions and the need to back this up by fostering their democratic legitimacy
(de Wilde and Zürn 2012).
An overview of recent research about European identity even concludes that there
are indications for a gradually growing identification of citizens with Europe as well
as the Europeanisation of national public debates. In a 2013 Eurobarometer poll,
59% of polled citizens showed some degree of identification with the EU while only
38% identified exclusively with the nation state. No significant divisions could be
found in creditor and debtor countries of the Eurozone in this respect (Risse 2014:
1208 f.). There are also indications that identification with Europe does not mainly
come as a symbolic attitude. According to Kuhn and Stoekel (2014), polling data
shows that the more people identify with Europe the more they are also prepared to
support policies of economic governance with re-distributional effects to overcome
the Euro crisis. Thus, the crisis and related conflicts do not necessarily lead to
reduced solidarity. Risse (2014: 1210) summarises that available opinion poll data
challenges the “no demos” thesis, leading to an optimistic notion that “. . . the
European polity is more mature than many scholars assume. A sense of community
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does exist among Europeans and this community might even be prepared to accept
redistributive consequences”. In the same vein, based on opinion polls and long-
term panel research with citizens from six European countries, Harrison and Bruter
(2014) conclude that there is evidence that the politicisation of European issues can
be seen as a cause as well as a result of the emergence of a European identity.
This implies that the more people appropriate themselves to the European polity,
“the more politicized is their perception of their—thereby appropriated—system”
(Harrison and Bruter 2014: 166).
However, these optimistic conclusions are not uncontested, and with a look at
nationalist and populist EU-scepticism all around Europe, not least after the Brexit
vote, it can reasonably be argued that neither politicisation nor an increase in
Europeanisation of media reporting in the current crisis (if observable) will have
positive effects on identities. The crisis clearly brings new forces and actors to the
fore that are not supportive of European integration and offer views that focus on
national interests and thus help to strengthen national identities (Checkel 2015;
Checkel and Katzenstein 2009). Based on a media analysis in six European countries
up to 2012 (thus including the Euro crisis), Grande and Kriesi (2015) report a
substantial increase in politicisation as well as Europeanisation of public discourses,
but are sceptical with regard to the effects of this on the identification of citizens with
Europe. They hold that since negative framing of the European integration goes
across the left–right party political cleavage, politicisation under the given political
structures will contribute to more EU-scepticism.
There is, however, consensus—also among observers with a more pessimistic
view on the current state of European solidarity and citizenship—that the European
public sphere has a strong bearing on the development of a European identity: “It is
in public debate that collective identities are constructed and reconstructed and
publicly displayed thereby creating political communities” (Pfetsch and Heft 2015:
30). It is therefore decisive to understand to what extent a public sphere in Europe
exists.
3.3 A European Public Sphere?
The public sphere can be understood as a space of political communication among
members of a territorially defined entity with a normative, legitimising function for a
particular political institution (see Lindner et al. 2016). Historically, the development
of a political public sphere is connected with the emergence of the nation state, so
that until the 1980s, speaking of a public sphere implied speaking of national public
spheres. However, with the globalisation of politics, policymaking is to a growing
extent related to transnational problems and problem-solving and, consequently, the
space of political communication is one that transcends national borders. Europe is
without doubt an example of transnational policymaking (Hepp et al. 2012: 22 ff.).
However, it is the subject of debate to what extent transnational policymaking is
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accompanied and thus legitimised by a functioning transnational European space of
political communication.
3.3.1 National Public Spheres “Europeanised”?
According to a recent review of scholarly discussion on the European public sphere,
the following can be regarded as being consensus among researchers: “The concept
of a utopian European public sphere, defined as a singular supranational space that
echoes the national public sphere, is nowadays rejected in the literature under the
evidence of a missing common European identity, the lack of significant purely
European media, and communication difficulties, namely language differences”
(Monza and Anduiza 2016: 503).
The European public sphere is almost exclusively conceptualised as the
Europeanisation of national public spheres. Europeanisation is then observable by
a change of national public spheres in three respects: (1) European issues, policies
and actors are visible in the “national” public spheres, i.e. in mass media coverage of
political issues, (2) there is reference in national media not only to EU policymaking
actors (vertical) but also to actors from other European Member States (horizontal)
and (3) the same issues are addressed in the different national public spheres and
similar frames of reference or claims and arguments are put forward. In all these
respects, there is apparently a consensus in research that a Europeanisation of public
spheres has taken place. Mass media studies have shown that over the past 15 years,
national publics have become more European in terms of the visibility and salience
of EU issues and actors, the presence of other Europeans in national public spheres,
as well as with regard to the similarity of interpretative frames of reference or claims
across borders, without the existence of European-wide media (Koopmanns and
Zimmermann 2010; Hepp et al. 2012; Sicakkan 2013; Risse 2014, contributions in
Risse 2015a). It can be said that positions claiming that the emergence of a European
public sphere is impossible, due to structural or mainly language barriers
(e.g. Grimm 1995), are almost no longer visible (Risse 2015b: 3). Meanwhile, the
Europeanisation of national public spheres has also been found by many issue-
specific media studies, such as in the discourse on the EU Diversity directive in
France (Dressler et al. 2012), the media coverage of the EU’s growth and job
strategy (de la Porte and van Dalen 2016), media coverage of the discussion about
a common EU foreign and security policy (Kandyla and de Vreese 2011) or by
analysis of references to the “European citizen” in national media (Walter 2015).
Additionally, a methodological approach which differs from the usual news content
analysis supports the notion of horizontal integration of the mediated European
public sphere. Data provided by Veltri (2012) via a network analysis of information
flow between Central European high-quality newspapers (UK, Germany, Spain,
France) indicate that from 2000 to 2009 the information flow became less dense
among the newspapers analysed, but that a more balanced network of information
flows among European newspapers took shape that can be interpreted as a signal of a
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qualitative transformation of the European communicative exchange in the direction
of horizontal integration. Beyond these general findings, in recent years research on
the European public sphere has brought about results that help to understand in what
respects we can speak of Europeanisation and also what its limits are. Despite
growing interest in Internet-based public communication and the role of social
media (see below), the vast majority of empirical work regarding the European
public sphere is still on the coverage of European issues, actors and institutions in
(national) mass media (mainly press). The vast amount of studies published in recent
years cannot be covered in detail in this chapter. In the following, we briefly sketch
the most interesting findings.
3.3.1.1 Dominance of EU Executive Institutions at the Costs
of the European Parliament
As regards the visibility of European actors, it appears that the European Parliament
lags behind other European institutions in being referred to in national mass media
reporting, and that national actors gained visibility due to the role of the European
institutions in the financial crisis. Koopmanns (2015) explores the degree of
Europeanisation on the basis of newspaper reports in six European countries from
1990 to 2002, and newspaper reporting on the financial crisis from 2010 to 2012 in
Germany. He found that for the debate on monetary politics the visibility and roles of
actors from the EU central institutions (vertical Europeanisation) as well of those
from other European countries (horizontal Europeanisation) in the newspapers’
coverage of European issues was comparable to the roles of national central and
regional actors in reports about national politics. However, the European level was
“more present as a target than as a speaker of claims in their own right”. Never-
theless, he concludes that “with one third of claims coming from [. . .] European-
level actors (mainly the European Central Bank), they make a substantial contri-
bution to opinion formation” (Koopmanns 2015: 81). For Germany, he found that in
the years of the financial crisis, 2010–2012, the discursive influence in media reports
in Germany “was almost equally balanced among domestic, transnational, and
European-level actors”, whereas during the introduction of the Euro (2000–2002),
there was a strong dominance by the European institutions. Koopmanns concludes
that Europeanised political communications “stand the comparison to the yardstick
of national public debates” (Koopmanns 2015: 82). From the German case he
concludes that the fact that national parliaments and other national political actors
regained influence in media reports on European financial issues can be read as a
welcome signal for the democratisation of European politics, whereas the significant
losses of discursive influence of all European institutions (except the ECB) indicate
the emergence of a more “intergovernmental” and “domesticated” Europe at the cost
of a supranational European polity (Koopmanns 2015: 82).
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3.3.1.2 EU-Scepticism as an Indication of Europeanisation of Public
Spheres
Not surprisingly the growing EU-scepticism in recent years is reflected in the media
coverage of European issues. However, this can also be seen as an indication of the
Europeanisation of the public sphere. A study of mass media reporting in The
Guardian, Le Monde, El País, La Stampa and Süddeutsche Zeitung on the
European Parliament elections in 2014 revealed a significant Europeanisation of
reporting in terms of the visibility of the EU campaign in the media analysed, as well
as the visibility of the EU institutions and actors (Belluati 2016). Despite national
particularities the study also found converging narratives on the elections and on
European integration. Paradoxically, the significant role of EU-scepticism in the
election campaign (such as UKIP in Great Britain, FN in France, AfD in Germany or
the Five Star Movement in Italy) led to a politicisation of the issue of European
integration that can be read as a “Europeanisation” of public debates, without
necessarily supporting a Eurosceptic tendency in the media reporting. The study
holds that the broad coverage of the EU election campaign, apart from the
Euroscepticism issue, was due to the fact that “the electorate has gained a more
direct voice in the selection of the President of the European Commission”, and EP
parties “for the first time have selected candidates for this position, hence structuring
the electoral campaign and giving visibility to such candidates. . .” (Belluati 2016:
131). This finding could possibly support the argument for the salience of a
European party system for the emergence of European will formation beyond
national borders, as discussed above.
A broad empirical study (www.Eurosphere.org) conceptualised the European
public sphere as a “conflictive space” by which the “vertical, pro-European, elite
dominated trans-European public sphere”, which is constituted by the EU insti-
tutions’ policies of European integration, comes into a relationship of conflict and
contestation with existing national and regional public spaces. The study’s results
suggest that this mode of Europeanisation of the public sphere is an existing reality
(Sicakkan 2013: 2). The study comprised interviews and media analysis of the EU’s
integration policies in 16 European countries and found that EU policies managed to
link national constituencies with the EU to a clearly discernible extent. This vertical
European public sphere, however, is dominated by an elitist and expert discourse of
democratisation, inclusion and Europeanisation. However, the “populist” reaction
against this discourse has transformed national publics into “horizontal
trans-European publics” (Sicakkan 2013: 68). Thus, the criticism of
Europeanisation itself—as it were—is “Europeanised”.
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3.3.1.3 Dominance of Political Elites, Lack of Visibility of Civil Society
Actors
The notion of a dominant role for political elites and the EU administration in
Europeanised public spheres is supported by the findings of Koopmanns and
Statham (2010). Studying media coverage of European political issues in the period
2001–2004, they found support for the notion that a European public sphere exists in
terms of the visibility of EU politics in national media. But it is mainly the political
elites that are represented, whereas civil society remains underrepresented as polit-
ical actors on EU issues. For the period covered by the study, they found that this
was connected with an overly supportive voice for European integration—remark-
ably with the exception of the British media coverage of the European institutions
and issues. Thus, they found a lack of contestation regarding EU issues (reflecting
what has been called the “permissive consensus”; see above). Studies covering the
period of the politicisation of Europe reflect the move away from the “permissive
consensus” of recent years (see below).
3.3.1.4 National Frames of Reference and Cultural Differences Remain
Relevant
One of the most salient results is that Europeanisation does not exclude and diminish
the role of national differences. It is obvious that with the lack of a common
European language or European media, political discourse on Europe still, and
despite Europeanisation, “. . .comes largely by way of national political actors
speaking to national publics in national languages reported by national media and
considered by national opinion” (Schmidt 2013: 13). To add to this picture, only a
small minority of educated EU citizens observe foreign media (Gerhards and Hans
2014, based on Eurobarometer surveys 2007: 2010). It also must be acknowledged
that generally EU issues still often rank behind national issues. A study of the media
coverage of the 2004 and 2009 European elections in the Czech Republic and
Slovakia (Kovář and Kovář 2013) found that—in line with the low voter turnout
and the “second order elections” thesis (that EP elections are politically less relevant
than national ones)—media only marginally cover EP elections and notably less than
national “first-order” elections. Additionally, coverage of EP elections is dominated
by domestic EU political actors, whereas visibility of EU actors was low. Both
applied especially to private TV stations, and to a lesser degree for quality
newspapers.
In those countries with (according to opinion polls, Eurobarometer) a more
positive attitude to the European Union, media coverage of EU issues is also more
intense than in countries with lower support for the EU, as was found in a study on
press coverage of the European Parliament in six EU countries between 2005 and
2007 (Gattermann 2013). Beyond these differences in the level of Europeanisation,
national discourses often differ significantly, and the way European issues are
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communicated by mass media is still to a great extent based on national identities,
which, e.g. is in turn reflected by a more sceptical and detached attitude towards
European integration in Britain as compared to a more positive one in Germany, as is
shown by Novy (2013). Hepp et al. (2012) analysed the development of references to
Europe and European policymaking in the content of quality and boulevard press in
six European countries, using media samples from the period of 1982–2008. They
clearly confirm the otherwise supported finding that national public spheres have
over the period of 26 years been increasingly transnationalised, i.e. Europeanised, in
terms of referring to European policy issues and discussing this with a view to other
public spheres in other EU Member States. Beyond this, Hepp et al.—via interviews
with journalists and observation of journalism practice in the countries included in
the study—found segmentation at the national level of an existing European public
sphere by different national discourse cultures which affect the practice of journal-
ism. This, e.g. shows up in different references to transnational (European) issues:
Whereas, e.g. in Denmark and the UK, reference to European issues is made in a
more distanced way, segregating these issues from the national context, in Germany,
France and Austria, such reference is made by relating it to the national context,
regarding the national as part of the transnational, European context. Despite such
effects of national discourse cultures, Hepp et al. conclude that in all countries
involved (except for Britain) reference to Europe is a routine part of journalism in
Europe and that it is a general practice to “construct” national identity in the context
of other European nations, so that somewhat paradoxically “. . . the stability of
national political discourse cultures are an aspect of the ‘substructure’ of a trans-
national European public sphere” (Hepp et al. 2012: 209, own translation).
Scarce studies dedicated to media analysis in new Member States often show
more negative results as regards the Europeanisation of public spheres. This scep-
tical perspective is supported by an analysis of the role of EU issues during the
Czech national parliament election campaigns in 2002, 2006 and 2010 (Urbanikova
and Volek 2014). The authors conclude from the low number and the content of
articles that referred to the EU that in the Czech press the EU agenda was increas-
ingly less visible over the period observed. Moreover, they discovered that it was
increasingly negatively framed. The study also found that the EU agenda was mainly
discussed with regard to economic and monetary issues, indicating that the EU
agenda “is increasingly reduced to an economic agenda” (Urbanikova and Volek
2014: 468), obviously indicating the growing importance of the fiscal and monetary
debate (not only in the Euro Zone), at least since 2009. Differences in national
framing among Member States have to be taken into account, and media coverage of
EU issues is more frequent in old Member States than in new ones. The attitudes of
actors prominent in media reports also tend to be more negative towards European
integration in the new rather than in the old Member States—as is supported by data
from the Eurosphere project (eurosphere.eu) on media coverage of the issues of the
“Reform Treaty” and the “EU Constitution” in 2008 (Zografova et al. 2012).
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3.3.2 Politicisation of the European Public Sphere
As with the debate about European identity, the notion of a “politicisation” of
Europe and the future of European integration is prominent in discussions and
research on the European public sphere. Despite the strong current of
EU-scepticism that comes with it, politicisation is believed by many to indicate a
vitalisation of the European public sphere (Statham and Trenz 2015). “Politics is
back”, as a volume with contributions on the latest state of debate about the
European public sphere puts it (Risse 2015a). Europe—its future, its mode of
policymaking and its democratic legitimacy—is an issue of vivid public debate
more than ever before. A few empirical studies are available on the effects of the
crisis and the subsequent politicisation of European integration on the “European
public spheres”. Their results show a growing dominance of national perspectives
and interest in public discourse on the EU, but do not necessarily dismiss the
notion of a European public sphere.
Findings of a large-scale media content analysis of newspaper and television
news in the EU-15 (1999), EU-25 (2004) and EU-27 (2009) in relation to European
Parliament elections show that media coverage of EU issues is dependent on the
elites’ or parties’ positions in the respective countries (Boomgaarden et al. 2013).
The more disputes among elites and national parties about European issues, the more
Europe becomes visible in the national media—which, however, implies a strong
position of EU-critical positions. It could be shown that “. . .increases in EU news
visibility were strongest in a situation in which there was both increasing negativity
about the EU in a country’s party system and increasing party disagreement about
the EU” (Boomgaarden et al. 2013: 621). The authors conclude that “. . . ironically,
euro-scepticism, in the form of elite polarisation, is one of the best chances for
improving EU democracy by sparking news coverage of EU affairs”
(Boomgaarden et al. 2013: 625).
A study (Monza and Anduiza 2016) focusing on exploring the visibility of the EU
and European subjects in national media during the financial and Euro crisis started
from the plausible hypothesis that with the strong consequences of EU policies, the
salience of EU issues in the news should have been increased, especially in those
countries that are subject to the EU austerity policy. The study—based on a set of
articles with reference to the crisis, recession or austerity from leading newspapers in
Germany, Greece, Italy, Spain, Poland, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK in the
period of 2008–2014—found that the visibility of European actors (in terms of
claims made related to the crisis as reported in the media as well as the addressees
of claims) was surprisingly low when compared to national actors, indicating that the
national perspective and national policymakers were dominant in the crisis dis-
course. The visibility of EU actors was highest in Germany (11% of the sample)
and Greece (11%), and lowest in the UK (4%) and Switzerland (1%). Differences in
the visibility of EU actors and issues were not correlated with the countries’ degree
of negative effect from the recession. The relative prominence of European issues
and actors in Germany and Greece can be explained by the German government’s
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leading role in debates on the Greek bailout and by Greece being the main addressee
of the European institutions’ austerity policy.
An analysis of news coverage of the Euro crisis (2010–2013) and the 2009
parliamentary elections in online media news platforms, held by leading national
newspapers or TV channels in 13 European countries (Michailidou 2015), found that
in all countries covered by the study the EU was uniformly contested and criticised
from the perspective of national politics, which in all cases were the key defining
frame of media reporting. The results of the content analysis suggest that there is
indeed a European-wide pattern of discussing the financial crisis and the role of EU
politics, mainly made up by EU contestation, which refers to the issue of (lacking)
democratic legitimation of EU politics, but mainly in a diffuse or emotional manner.
Interestingly, especially concerning the online comments on EU news posted by
readers, the study showed that, “. . .democracy is the most frequently used category
to contextualise or justify not only Eurosceptic comments but evaluations of the EU
polity across the entire ‘affirmative European to anti-European’ spectrum. What
unites the user community is its anti-elitism and self-understanding of constituting
the people’s voice that mobilizes in defence of the representative system of democ-
racy or more frequently against the corrupt, decaying version” (Michailidou 2015:
332). What appears to be interesting about this finding is that the crisis apparently
brought the issue of democracy into the centre of the debate, thus stressing the
relevance of the “EU democratic deficit” issue for the European public sphere in
times of crisis.
In the politicised and Europeanised national public spheres, the national perspec-
tive in times of crisis appears to be dominant, but a study on the few broadcasting
formats at the transnational European level found the framing of European issues in
terms of European solidarity to be dominant (Williams and Toula 2017). In an
analysis of the debate programme “Talking Europe”, which is produced with the
sponsorship of the European Parliament and the Commission and has been broadcast
on “France 24” since early 2009, it was found “. . . that the solidarity frame is used to
define problems and causes of issues and events as attributable to a lack of solidarity
between EU members and also to present the solution of increasing solidarity as a
means to enhance policy and practice. Moral judgments are introduced to cast
blame on those actors who do not demonstrate solidarity. Problems framed in terms
of solidarity deficits are then remedied through three-pronged solutions of integra-
tion, harmonization, and calls for greater solidarity” (Williams and Toula 2017: 8).
The analysis focused on episodes dealing with the Eurozone crisis between
January and November 2011.
All in all, empirical research on the effects of the crisis on the Europeanisation of
national media publics appears to show mixed results. “Politicisation” is an indicator
of European issues coming to the fore of national agendas, but this, of course, does
not necessarily lead to issues being framed as questions of common European
concern requiring European solutions. It depends on discursive structures and
dynamics of whether politicised debates about Europe foster European common
thinking and identities or renationalisation. Politicisation must come with
Europeanisation: With a view to Brexit, it is interesting to note that research has
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shown that in the British public sphere Europe is highly politicised but Europeanised
to a much lower degree (with respect to frames and visibility of European actors,
Koopmanns and Statham 2010; see also Koopmanns 2015). It thus appears to be
important whether or not pro-European elites use the politicisation of Europe for
rethinking the democratic structures of the EU and/or actively engage in a discussion
about options to address the democratic deficit (Risse 2015c). The fact that issues of
European integration, European democracy as well as modes of European gover-
nance are found to be increasingly contested in the European public spheres does not
necessarily imply dysfunctional workings of European political communication.
Contestation and conflict are as much a necessary function of the public sphere as
striving for consensus and compromise, or aggregation of political will. It can even
be said that if empirical studies should find a lack of disagreement on central
constitutional issues—as are at stake in debates on the legitimacy of EU policy
interventions in times of crisis—this might not be taken as an indication that “desired
consensus processes has run its course in the European public spheres”. It could
also be seen as an indication that public arenas are not yet “fully developed and
utilized in a truly democratic manner” (Føllesdal 2015: 254). In other words, as is
held by a broad scope of scholars of European studies, the contestation of Europe as
a democratic project is as much an indication of a failure of the European public
sphere as the long period of the so-called “permissive consensus”—with a low level
of discussion about European integration—was an indication of its functioning.
3.3.3 Deficits of Research
The discussion of media analysis of the European public sphere has brought up some
shortcomings and deficits of research that should be taken account of when
interpreting research results. Especially with regard to the increasing EU criticism
in some new Member States, it has to be kept in mind that research has so far mainly
focused on the old EU15, and there is not much data about the development of the
public sphere in new Member States (especially in those countries currently being
front runners of EU-scepticism). Data showing a widely Europeanised public sphere
is mainly from central and western European Member States (with the exception of
the UK). On the one hand, research would expect that “in the course of time
differences in the Europeanisation of old and new Member States seem to vanish”,
since they observe a “pattern of catch-up Europeanisation” (Kleinen von Königslow
and Möller 2009: 101, cit. Pfetsch and Heft 2015: 45). Others hold a more pessi-
mistic view with regard to this “modernisation story” and point to the different
historical backgrounds of new Member States in Central and Eastern Europe, as well
as cultural aspects like a strong and orthodox religious current in some countries that
might persist (Checkel 2015: 236 f.).
Since media analysis is mainly done by using data from quality newspapers,
which are read mainly by elites, the finding of a step-by-step Europeanisation found
here might not apply for TV or other newspapers, which are the reference for the
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average public (Koopmanns 2015). It has also been stressed that we have to take into
account that the focus of research on elite mass media communication neglects the
relevance of new Internet-based communication networks mainly applied by
social movements, which can be regarded as a Europeanisation of public spheres
“from below” (Bennett et al. 2015). The focus of research on mass media might on
the one hand overstate Europeanisation, but on the other might underestimate the
diversity of publics and their segmentation, the latter coming into focus in
research on political communication via the Internet.
3.4 The Internet and the Public Sphere
The idea of the Internet as a “virtual” or a “networked” public sphere—as articulated
by Castels (2008)— starts from the notion that due to the option of interactive
communication which is unrestricted with regard to time and space, the web is
enabling a new and enhanced public sphere that transcends national boundaries. For
example, it provides new options for civil society actors to make their demands
visible and reinforces communication between constituencies and their political
representatives. Recent years have brought about more detailed empirical analysis
of the Internet’s relevance for political communication, thus complementing the
previously mass media focused research on the public sphere. With a view to the
widespread use of political blogs and social media by political actors of all kinds,
there can be no doubt that the web has developed into a new space of political
exchange alongside the mass media. Political actors can address their communities
and followers directly and forward their comments and news via Internet platforms
and social media (and vice versa). Mass media has built up web-based news
platforms and uses the web as a source for news production. However, research
and scholarly debate on the virtual public sphere—an overview of which is given in
the following pages—do not give uncontested evidence for a new or revitalised
public sphere being realised by the options of political Internet communication.
Whereas the new means of communication among citizens as well as between
policymakers and their constituencies have been seen initially mainly as drivers
towards a more vivid public sphere of open debate, meanwhile the negative, as it
were, “anti-deliberative” aspects of social media have come to the fore.
3.4.1 The Democratic Potential of the Internet as a Public
Sphere
Bohman (2004; see also Lindner et al. 2016) regarded the Internet as opening up a
new mode of transnational political publics, due to the possibility of allowing for
communication across the restrictions of time and space and also national and
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linguistic boundaries. He thus expressed some optimism that, while we find a decline
of national public spheres with passive audiences and disenchantment with politics,
the Internet could support the emergence of a transnational public sphere that is more
inclusive and deliberative and is rooted in a transnational civil society. But such
far-reaching expectations are now rarely put forward.
There is, without doubt, a growing importance and public visibility of so-called
“dot.com” protest platforms and social media-based exchange across national bor-
ders on humanitarian or environmental issues, which is held to show features of an
emerging global civil society. Local protest movements can have outreach to the
world, make their demands known and gather support globally—e.g. the movement
of the outraged in Spain and Greece. The “Occupy Wall Street”movement managed
to engage on a global level via social media. World economic summits and
climate change summits are regularly accompanied by online mediated activities
of NGOs. Thus, globalisation at the economic and governmental levels can be
regarded as being complemented by an Internet-supported global civil society
organising counter- or protest discourses (e.g. Frangonikolopoulos 2012). Bohman
(2004; see Lindner et al. 2016) conceptualised this Internet-based transnational
public sphere as consisting of multiple issue-related publics, thus creating a
public of publics with a distributed rather than a centralised structure. Additionally,
currently observers who are more sceptical with regard to the emergence of a trans-
national public sphere underline the capacity of Internet communication to induce
global political communication in an “. . . indirect and networked sense—not as a
supra-national sphere, but as a multitude of mediated and unmediated discursive
processes aimed at opinion formation at various levels, interconnected directly and
indirectly” (Rasmussen 2013: 103). If this is a correct description of the Internet’s
structure as a public sphere, then the decisive question is to what extent these
multiple publics are related to or cut off from one another. Smith (2015) regards
the ease of creating new websites or digital platforms (by everybody and for any
purpose) as a political “double-edged sword”, as it makes it “both easier to create
common realms open to all and to leave the common world and create one’s own
little realm where no opposing viewpoints can be heard” (Smith 2015: 256). Thus,
the Internet has the potential for both creating new public spaces and weakening the
general public sphere.
A fundamental critique of the discourse on the virtual public sphere looks at the
economic fundaments of social media and peer-to-peer networks. From this per-
spective the democratic potential of the Internet’s ability to allow for self-production
of content, independent of the restrictions of the mass media, is called into question.
The explosion of self-production and exchange of content is regarded as funda-
mentally based on a growing economy of transmission and exchange of data by
providers such as Google or Facebook. With a view inspired by Michel Foucault’s
analysis of governmentality, Goldberg (2010) concludes the following in his criti-
cism of the scholarly discourse on the “virtual public sphere”: “On the internet there
is no ‘debating and deliberating’ that is not also ‘buying and selling’[. . .]; partici-
pation is a commercial act. Every instance of participation involves a transfer of
data which has been economized, driving the profitability and viability of the
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networking industry and of internet based companies like Google that cover infra-
structure costs through innovative advertising, ‘freemium’ business models, and
other methods” (Goldberg 2010: 749).
Jürgen Habermas, one of the most important thinkers of the model of deliberative
democracy, appears to be rather sceptical as regards the potential of the Internet to
foster a modernised, renewed democratic sphere of public discourse when postu-
lating the decisive and indispensable function of a lively public sphere for modern
democracy. When asked in an interview in 2014, “Is internet beneficial or
unbeneficial for democracy?”, his answer was “neither one nor the other” (Habermas
2014b). He substantiates this notion by referring to what in his view was and is the
central function of the public sphere for democracy, which allows for the simulta-
neous attention of an undefined number of people to be paid to public problems.
Despite increased transparency and access to information for everybody as well as
the option to make every reader an author of statements on the web, the web in
Habermas’ view does not help to concentrate the attention of an anonymous public
on a few political important questions. By opening up a vast scope of single-issue
spaces, the web rather “distracts and dispels”. The web thus is a mare magnum of
digital noises containing billions of communities as dispersed archipelagos and is
not able to bring about a space of common (public) interests. In order to bring about
concentration, the skills of good old journalism are still needed (all quotations from
Habermas 2014b).
The conclusion by West (2013, following Dahlgren 2005) that the Internet may
be best understood as an agent of mobilisation of sub-publics with regard to all kinds
of issues as an “extension” for the mass media public sphere appears to catch a
seminal feature of Internet political communication, but also underlines the restric-
tions of its democratic potential: “The ability of the internet to quickly rally people,
as in the 2011 ‘Occupy’ movements, is difficult to contest. But, as subsequent events
has (sic) shown, the ability of the new electronic media to transform those move-
ments into lasting social change, or to use the new media as a public sphere whose
discourse must be reckoned with, is not yet evident” (West 2013). In this respect the
conclusion we drew a couple of years ago (Lindner et al. 2016) that the Internet is at
best an emerging public sphere would still hold. However, substantial differentiation
with regard to different modes and formats of political Internet communication is
visible in the scholarly debates and empirical research in publications of the past few
years.
3.4.2 A New Landscape of Political Communication: A
Public Sphere from Below?
The widespread use of new modes of political communication via the Internet
indicates that Internet communication is indeed about to modify the public sphere
from one mediated by mass media (and mass communication) to one mediated by a
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multitude of networks based on the interpersonal exchange and interactivity allowed
by the Internet. From this point of view, the public sphere then exists of a network
with nodes being made up by web-based spaces of political discussion, organised on
websites or social media sites held by individuals, social interest groups, govern-
mental authorities or political parties. Ideally, these different nodes are connected to
one another so that the different issue-related or socially organised political com-
munication spaces are not completely isolated but form some sort of new networked
public sphere. As far as such networks also reach across national borders, one might
speak of transnational public spheres emerging from below, rather than from above
through the mega television networks offered to world audiences (Munteanu and
Staiculescu 2015).
Transnational issue advocacy networks of Civil Society Organisations (CSOs)
mainly mediated via social media (Twitter, Facebook, YouTube) and NGO websites
are held to have the capacity “to engage large publics directly” and bring them into
contact with government institutions, enabling people to coordinate action across
national boundaries (Bennett 2012: 6). In the social science literature on the political
relevance of social media, there are both expectations that social media have the
potential to empower underrepresented interests, as well as more sober assessments
which doubt that social media will help to reduce inequalities in the political sphere.
Despite these far-reaching and contradictory expectations, a recent analysis of
literature on interest groups’ use of social media concludes that “systematic, quan-
titative literature of social media use of interest groups is scarce” (van der Graaf
et al. 2016: 121).
The new modes of communication via the Internet have obviously modified
formats of mass communication. Nowadays, there is probably almost no mass
media which do not host an Internet-based news site besides their print or broad-
casting versions. These news sites regularly have comment sections, which offer the
opportunity for online readers to comment on and discuss the news articles offered at
the site. Thus, previously passive readers have the option to publicly express their
political thoughts and ideas. A media content analysis including a study of reader’s
comments via online news sites, published in 2015, found that at the beginning of the
period of research in 2009 social media was not very well integrated in online news
sites. Since then, all news sites have incorporated social media “sharing” functions,
and in the EU “. . . readers’ participation through Web 2.0 functions has thus
dramatically increased”. This was found to apply particularly “. . . in Southern
Member States where internet availability and use was previously lagging behind
the North-Western countries” (Michailidou 2015: 331).
Social media currently also function as a news source for mass media. Facebook
and Twitter posts trigger mass media reports. Especially, online portals of mass
media not only have their own Twitter or Facebook accounts but allow readers to
forward news from online news portals. Mass media also regularly include social
media posts in their news and reports about political issues. In this respect, there are
channels that allow content from segmented and issue- or community-specific
publics organised via social media to find its way into the general political public
sphere.
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Social media are increasingly used by interest groups and play an important role
in political campaigning and organisation, and the coordination of political activities,
since they are supportive of building communities around certain issues and interests
by direct communication with supporters. There is no doubt about the growing
importance of social media for political communication (Chalmers and Shotton
2013; Obar et al. 2012). Social media, or formats like political blogs, have changed
the public sphere, not only by adding something to old forms of mass media public
spheres but also by partially substituting them. Expectations from 10 years ago that
political blogging would substitute traditional journalism still appear to be exagger-
ated. But notions predicting that web communication would not affect mass media
journalism at all have proved to be dewy-eyed. Today, new mixed models of
journalism are observed where leading newspapers incorporate “blogs, columns
and news stories and where writers may be bloggers one day and reporters the
next” (Zuckerman 2014: 158 for an analysis of digital journalism; see also Peters and
Witschge 2015). The enormous popularity of comment sections has recently
attracted intense interest among communication scholars (for an overview see
Toepfl and Piwoni 2015). Surveys show an increased spread of comment sections
on online news sites, and research indicates that user-generated content on comment
sites influences readers’ perceptions of public opinion and can change the reader’s
personal opinion.
Internet activism as a new form of protest is gaining influence in the public
sphere. There is little doubt among researchers that meanwhile it is obvious that it is
“the norm, not the exception, for political and activist campaigns to rely on social
media, crowdfunding and other digital techniques as well as advertising, lobbying
and conventional fundraising” (Zuckerman 2014: 158). Online communication is
used by political actors and activists in many ways: for spreading information and
news online, for e-mobilisation (using online tools to facilitate offline protests), for
online participation (e.g. online petitions) and for organising movement efforts
online, so that there are discussions of whether pure online activism might reduce
the relevance of (offline) NGOs (Earl 2015). Thus, social media and online debates
are regarded as having the potential to function as counter-publics to the established
and published discourse (originally Fraser 1992; see Dahlberg 2011). Especially in
developing countries, which often lack media channels for underprivileged groups,
social media is seen as a means to empower the poor and increase the possibilities for
them to influence or petition the government (e.g. Hoskins 2013). Impressive social
movements and uprisings in recent years have shown that the Internet, and especially
communication via social media, has been widely supportive of networking and the
public campaigning of social movements. The attention to completely new forms of
bottom-up spontaneous political activism fostered by the political use of social
media was especially triggered by the revolutionary movements in North-African
countries (the so-called Arab Spring) that led (albeit mostly temporarily)—to fos-
tering democratic structures of public debate and governance in previously auto-
cratic regimes (see contributions in Kumar and Svensson 2015; Özcan 2014). This
perspective has not only been tempered by the observable autocratic or oligarchical
backlash in most of the Spring-countries, but also by analysis that shows that years
70 L. Hennen
of offline planning, negotiation and organisation made the Arab Spring possible,
suggesting that social media was nothing but a supportive tool that has been used for
campaigning and organising counter-publics (Lim 2012; Bennett and Segerberg
2012).
The potential of social media to establish “counter-publics” is undoubtable, but
this potential also has its downside, with effects which are detrimental to a demo-
cratic public sphere. Following the public sphere concept of John Dewey (2012:
1927), that publics emerge as soon as knowledge about a public problem evolves, it
appears to be plausible that such knowledge is now more easily spread and thus
potentially combines formerly unconnected individuals into concerned publics (see
Farrell 2014) by organising all kinds of Internet fora, social media, etc. on any
political question. It is, however, evident that new modes of political Internet
communication not only have the capacity to support the emergence of counter-
publics and the empowerment of civil society groups, but are also effective tools for
campaigning by established political actors, institutions and groups. It was quite
clear, before Donald Trump as US President made Twitter his preferred media of
political communication, which has dominated mass media coverage of the elections
in many ways (Enli 2017), that political Internet communication can also be
regarded as a battlefield, with all kinds of manipulative strategies and tools applied
to steer public opinion (Bradshaw and Howard 2017). The use of social media in
electoral campaigning in Western democracies, often referred to as improving the
options for civil society to connect to political representatives, is—as has been
shown by analysis of the use of social media in US electoral campaigns (Kreiss
2012, also Towner and Dulio 2012)—far from being self-organised bottom-up
support for candidates, but is “meticulously planned, tested, and crafted by highly
bureaucratic, hierarchical institutions” (Wells 2014).
It is also noteworthy that the option for organised as well as individual actors to
introduce their political thoughts or preferences into the public sphere and establish
counter-publics is not bound to anti-establishment or grass-root world views. A
study of the online news site of opinion-leading German newspapers, published in
the aftermath of the 2013 national elections (Toepfl and Piwoni 2015), analysed
journalistic articles as well as user comments regarding the new German Anti-Euro
party “AfD” and found clear indications that while the news sections of the sites
(journalists’ content) unanimously painted a dismissive picture of the new party, the
comment sections were mainly used to challenge this mainstream consensus. The
authors conclude that in the comment sections, “. . . a powerful counter (sub) public
sphere had emerged. Remarkably, approximately 75% of comments supported a new
party that just days before only 4.7% of the electorate had voted for. In essence,
these findings thus showcased how an emergent collective of counter public-minded
individuals were exploiting the comment sections of Germany’s opinion-leading
news websites in order to create a highly visible—and therefore enormously pow-
erful - counter-public sphere” (Toepfl and Piwoni 2015: 482).
All in all, the landscape of political communication has changed, which has in
many ways empowered civil society to get access to the public sphere. However, this
may not challenge existing structures and hierarchies as much as expected by
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e-democracy enthusiasts. As referred to above, Koopmanns and Statham (2010; see
also Koopmanns 2015) found claims of CSOs being underrepresented in media
reporting on European political issues when compared to institutional actors, based
on a sample of quality journals in six EU Member States. This was especially the
case for media reports on European issues. Interestingly, an analysis of websites
conducted within the framework of the same study did not find a more balanced
representation of institutional and civil societal actors (Koopmanns and Zimmer-
mann 2010), leading to the conclusion that the Internet replicated power hierarchies
that affected actors’ abilities to reach audiences. Without overstating this (and other)
single findings, since the overall state of research on the empowering force of the
Internet is still insufficiently developed, it can be summarised that there is an online
space for political communication with many new features and options that go
beyond or bypass mass media channels. It is, however, subject to debate as to
what extent these features have the potential and are set into practice to democratise
political communication and public discourse. It is quite clear that despite the
democratic potential of many of its features, “. . .the internet and related techno-
logies are increasingly identified as posing threats to democratic structures and
participation in politics and society” (Dutton 2018: 4). Features that add to this
picture are the misuse of personal data for political advertising, by personal profiling
and micro-targeting (Kind and Weide 2017; Dubois 2017), as in the case of
Facebook, where user data was obtained by the political consulting company
Cambridge Analytica for personal profiling and selective political campaigning.
Manipulative strategies are supported by the application of algorithms (social bots)
to automatically spread messages in social media communities which are presented
as having been posted by users, and thus falsely produce the perception that the
message spread is shared by a vast majority of (fake) community members (Wardle
and Derakshan 2017). A basic feature of political Internet communication that is
massively opposed to any notion of a public sphere as a shared space of rational
discourse is the tribal structure of social media communication. Any content is
shared and distributed mainly among communities of like-minded people, who
join the same filter bubble (Pariser 2011) of content. Anything that is posted by
members of these bubbles (or by a bot pretending the content has been posted by
many members) has a pre-established reliability bonus since it confirms the world-
views and identities held by members and is (factually or apparently) distributed by
people “like us” in whom we can trust. Social media in this respect can be regarded
as being tailor-made for spreading news and preventing it from being counter-
checked by other sources. News is travelling within or in between peer-to-peer
networks and not via media, which are able to create a public space in which content
might be checked by gatekeepers and, can be, respectively, criticised in a public
(i.e. open to everybody) manner. One effect of this, beyond any single attempts at
disinformation or manipulation, might be to render a rational debate impossible,
because citizens enclosed in their specific filter bubble do not see any possibility—
beyond their peer community—to tell wrong from right, deceit from the truth or
rational reasoning from emotional affect.
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3.4.3 Deliberative Quality of Online Political Communication
Despite the negative effects mentioned above, it still is the interactive quality of
Internet communication that is the anchor of accounts that the virtual public sphere
has the potential to foster the deliberative quality of public discourse, compared to
mass media publics. Deliberative quality implies an open exchange among a broad
spectrum of perspectives and views, without restrictions as regards access to the
discourse, the right to speak, and the willingness to listen and rationally react to
opposing perspectives. With regard to this, political social media sites and political
blogs come into perspective. In a review of research on online deliberation, Freelon
(2015) sees two perspectives being dominant in research. One research thread
studies the deliberative content of online political communication, asking to what
extent online political communication meets normative criteria such as civility,
reciprocity and reason-giving. The other thread focuses on “selective exposure”,
based on the assumption that “exposure to a diverse array of information sources is
good for democracy, while the exclusive consumption of opinion reinforcing content
is problematic” (Freelon 2015: 774). Many studies focus on specific case studies of
Internet fora, blogs and others. According to Freelon, there is consensus that online
political discussions mostly do not meet the quality criteria of deliberative content.
As regards the “selective exposure” perspective, Freelon sees mixed results. Some
studies support the notion that online debates reinforce the exclusive consumption of
opinion-reinforcing content, while other studies cannot support the selective expo-
sure thesis (Freelon 2015: 773 ff.). Liu and Weber (2014) come to similar conclu-
sions for research on social media. Due to the enormous amount of literature
available, it is impossible to undertake a systematic tour d’horizon through available
research at this point. In the following, a few examples from recent studies are given
to illustrate the “quality of content” as well as the “selective exposure” perspective.
Generally, the political “blogosphere”, which began in the late 2000s, gave rise to
far-reaching expectations of the positive effects on democracy in terms of bringing
about a new space for open and rational exchange across political affiliations. Seen
from the perspective of established politics, the blogosphere should bring about a
new space to learn about public worries, expectations and needs, thus supporting the
functionality of the public sphere for the responsiveness of the political system.
However, blogs often show features of political exchange among elites and/or well-
educated publics, and rather than opening up spaces for deliberation across political
communities or perspectives, they often appear to foster communication only among
like-minded communities. As regards the quality of content, new social media and
the so-called “blogosphere” have been diagnosed to show strong discrepancies along
the lines of established politics and more informal use by citizens. While online
media are often used by policymakers in a vertical manner of communication and
“replicate the worst aspects of the established political communication system, with
politicians running blogs that look like old-fashioned newsletters”, citizens’ ini-
tiatives use blogs and social media more as a means of horizontal communication
among peers (Coleman and Blumler 2012: 146).
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Empirical studies, mainly based on an analysis of hyperlinks between different
political blogs, show contradictory results: There are indications that blogs have a
potential to foster deliberation in terms of exchange on political issues across
political affiliations, as well as examples of blogs that function as spaces for
in-group self-assurance (see research overview in Silva 2014). A study of the leading
political blogs in Romania (2013, 2014) found that other than the mass media
commitment to neutrality, users of political blogs clearly tend to choose blogs that
support their political thinking and position (Munteanu and Staiculescu 2015). A
network analysis of 20 of the most popular political blogs in Portugal (Silva 2014:
200) during national election campaigns could not find support for the thesis that
blogs tend to polarise political positions “. . . blogs managed by citizens interested in
politics do engage in conservations and debates regardless of the ideology. We find
right and left wing blogs linking to each other, thus indicating that they share issues
and themes of debate, interests, and arguments”. Negative reactions among partici-
pants “. . . that intend to mock or show contempt, insult and hamper dissident voices”
were found to be of minor relevance.
The example of the Norwegian Labour Party’s (MyLabourParty) websites, with
blog-like articles and comments, shows that the extent to which online blogs or
social media sites allow for open debates and political communication depends on
their design and purpose. For inner party communication, blogs are used for
distributing news among party members and supporters, while others are meant to
reach out to a wider public. Analysing different online offerings from the Norwegian
Labour Party (Johannessen and Følstad 2014), it was found that blogs whose
contributors are mainly or only party members tend to be restricted in triggering
debates when compared to sites that are also open to opposing political opinions. It
has been shown by a broad network analysis of the online discussion forum of the
Italian Five Star Movement that online discussion platforms provided by political
parties and groups are not necessarily platforms for mutual self-assurance. The Five
Star Movement owes its foundation to the exceptional success of a political blog run
by its founder, Beppe Grillo, in 2009. The widely used online forum of the
movement, according to Bailo (2015), did not show significant tendencies of
fragmentation of the online community using the forum. Many users engaged in
discussions on different topics, thus the debate was not structured in accordance with
specific interests or values held. The author concludes that people “are more
interested in engaging rather than convincing each other” and they come to the
forum “mainly to socialise their ideas and be exposed to other’s thoughts on issues
they are interested in” (Bailo 2015: 564).
As regards the quality of communication, the anonymity that is allowed for in
Internet chats, fora or social media has always been held to be conducive to allow for
a situation that comes close to the ideal of deliberative exchange of arguments
implied in Habermasian discourse theory, because anonymity allows us to disregard
hierarchical factors such as social status. It is, however, mainly the anonymity of
communication that often gives way to idiosyncratic and untrustworthy talk, to
bullying or the erratic dismissal of the arguments of other users. While anonymity
can strengthen the focus of participants on the argument rather than the person, and
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thus increase deliberative quality, at the same time it implies a lack of social control
that can lead to emotional and erratic behaviour, as has been found, e.g. by analysis
of Twitter discussions on new abortion legislation in the UK by Jackson and
Valentine (2014). This—with regard to a rational exchange of arguments as the
core of a deliberative public sphere—destructive feature of Internet communication,
especially of social media, is represented by the “troll”. The intervention of the troll
in social media communication, or in the comment sections of mass media, by
posting statements meant to destroy the mood of serious exchange of arguments
by insulting and bullying participants, discrediting their credibility and spreading
doubtful “news”, is a ubiquitous phenomenon. The role of the troll—originally an
obscure niche existence—can even be said to have made it into mainstream political
communication (Hannan 2018). Not only does the “puer robustus”, like US Presi-
dent Trump, stand for this but also the aggressive style of political communication
introduced by many populist, right-wing movements in Europe. “Twitter wars” are
meanwhile featured in quality mass media. Hannan (2018), in an instructive and
pessimistic analysis, develops an account of trolling as the political mode of com-
munication inscribed in the social media technology itself, undermining the value of
“truth”: “Disagreements on social media reveal a curious epistemology embedded
within their design. Popularity now competes with logic and evidence as an arbiter
of truth. [. . .] Lengthy detailed disquisitions do not fare well against short, biting
sarcasm. They also do not fare well against comments that, however inane, rack up a
far greater number of likes. In the mental universe of social media, truth is a
popularity contest” (Hannan 2018: 33).
Looking at empirical studies of communicative practice in political fora and other
spaces, the seriousness of the above sketched analysis revealing the anti-democratic
aspect of Internet communication cannot really be questioned, but such studies can
support the notion that there is another, democratic potential that can be realised
given the right frame of conditions. This deliberative quality was found to be
dependent on factors of political culture. A study using 15,000 comments from
five national newspaper online sites conducted by Ruiz et al. (2011) found two
models of audience participation in online fora of newspapers: in the first, “commu-
nities of debate” are formed based on mostly respectful discussions between diverse
points of view. This model—more in line with deliberative norms—was found in
Anglo-American newspapers (The Guardian and The New York Times). The second
model of “homogenous communities” is characterised by expressing feelings about
current events and has fewer features of an argumentative debate, less respect
between participants and less pluralism, and was found in European newspapers
(El País, Le Monde and La Republica). The authors regard this difference to be an
effect of different cultures of journalism based on the political cultures of the
respective countries. While a culture of “internal pluralism” is dominant in the
Anglo-American case, with newspapers not being aligned with a particular political
position, a culture of “polarised pluralism” is dominant in the European case, where
“participants are mostly aligned with the ideological perspective of the newsroom:
Citizens participate in the spaces provided by their news website of choice, mostly
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finding similar positions to theirs and editorial content that fosters political polar-
ization” (Ruiz et al. 2011: 483).
Freelon (2015) has conducted a comparison across two technical platforms:
Twitter hashtags and online newspapers comment sections. One of his central
conclusions is that issue hashtags on Twitter made it more likely that discussions
were of a more “communitarian”—meaning in-group and self-assurance—character,
whereas comment sections on online news (which are more open to and are
accessible by broader mass publics) were more likely to generate discourse with
deliberative features such as openness to and exchange among a diverse and
contradicting scope of arguments and statements. Research regarding the question
of to what extent blogs, Internet fora and political social network sites can contribute
to or foster features of an ideal public sphere (in terms of equality, inclusiveness and
rationality of discourse) generally show mixed results.
It is well known that new populist movements rely very much on social media to
organise and mobilise their members and followers (e.g. Januschek and Reisigl
2014). There are indications that social media fosters a “closed shop” in which
those who are already convinced mutually reconfirm their ideology and their pre-
judices, rather than providing for a democratic and open rational exchange of
arguments. Generally, this thesis is connected to the notion that while mass media
normally provide for a mixed or balanced view of differing standpoints on political
issues, the Internet (due to its ability to organise certain communities) is suspected
“that recruitment, radicalization, and incitement are facilitated” via its tendency “to
foster echo chambers where people are denied feedback contrary to their own views,
which are therefore reinforced” (O’Hara and Stevens 2015). While O’Hara and
Stevens reject this thesis as portraying a general feature of political Internet com-
munication, there are indications that it holds true for the use of social media and
website communication by extremist and populist movements (Warner and Neville-
Shepard 2014).
In a broad review of research and scholarly discussion on the changes in news
supply and consumption on the Internet, Tewksbury and Rittenberg (2012) found
some evidence for fragmentation and polarisation of audiences alongside political
predispositions, due to the multitude of specialised news sites. However, they argue
that the fact that there is a multitude of specialised news sites and that some people
restrict their information consumption to a certain set of news sites does not
necessarily imply that they do not share common public knowledge as well as public
agendas: “Fragmentation and polarization are ideas, still, more than observable
realities. There is ample evidence that many people are specialising their news
consumptions in ways that might lead to either or both outcomes. There is less
evidence that knowledge and opinion are fragmenting and/or polarizing. Most of the
uncertainty about the operation of these phenomena stems from a lack of research; it
rarely lies with disconfirming studies” (Tewksbury and Rittenberg 2012: 143). On
the other hand, they found evidence that the Internet offers more user control with
regard to choice of content as well as with regard to contribution to news production,
which can be regarded as “information democratization”. But also in this regard, it is
not yet clear to what extent the potential will become a reality. Counter tendencies of
76 L. Hennen
fragmentation and the dominance of strong media companies on the web, as well as
regulation on the content of the Internet are regarded as interfering with the demo-
cratic empowerment of the audience (Tewksbury and Rittenberg 2012: 144 ff.).
Political communication via social media extends the opportunities for indi-
viduals to post their own thoughts about any kind of public event and share it with
friends or peer groups. In a more optimistic view, this is regarded as being in line
with a general change of civic identities that has been observed for decades and
represents a shift away from materialist to post-materialist and individualist values.
More individualistic expression of self and weakening ties to formal organisations
(parties, unions), and collectives (class) is regarded as being expressed as well as
pushed by the use of social media. Individual choices made possible by the
Internet allow connection to all kinds of cultures, social groups and preferences,
and this comes at the cost of adherence to widely shared ideologies or bigger (public)
formal organisations such as political parties (see, e.g. Wells 2014; Bennett and
Segerberg 2012).
On the other hand, a clear danger when restricting oneself to these formats of
political information and communication is the segmentation into peer groups or
issue-related publics. In addition, one runs the danger of the complete loss of
connection to any broader sphere of exchange among competing perspectives on
contested issues of public (in the meaning of national or transnational) interest—
which in the worst case would lead to idiosyncratic discussions and worldviews. As
Zuckerman (2014: 165) puts it: “Social media allows the friends you follow online to
participate in setting your political agenda, adding dots to the canvas that are in
your immediate line of sight. We likely need a new class of tools and practices too
help us step back and see our interests and perspectives in a broader context.”
3.4.4 The Internet and the European Public Sphere
The visibility of European issues in mass media has always been part of the focus of
empirical research on the European public sphere. However, research on the rele-
vance of political communication on the Internet for building a European public
sphere or supporting the Europeanisation of national public spheres is scarce. What
comes into focus first is the use of web-based communication by the European
Commission. It is only recently that “issue publics”, organised via the web by civil
society actors, has come into the focus of research with regard to their potential to
“Europeanise” the public sphere. This also applies for the use of social media by
Eurosceptic movements and political parties. The latter, as has been shown above,
can be said to form real “echo-chambers” of “EU bashing”.
Following a programmatic turn to new and open forms of governance laid out in
the White Paper on Governance (EC 2001), following the Irish “No” to the treaty of
Nice (2001), the EC began to actively fund and set up citizen participation and public
consultation activities through its “Plan D for Democracy Dialogue and Debate”
(EC 2005) in 2005, as a response to the rejection of the constitutional treaty in the
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French and Dutch referenda. This was explicitly meant to strengthen the develop-
ment of the European public sphere, also via means of e-participation (see Yang
2013; see also Lindner et al. 2016). Part of this strategy was to connect the process of
EU policy formulation and legislation to the European constituency by inviting civil
society actors and interest groups to participate in online consultations on issues
under EU regulation via the EC’s web portal, “Your voice in Europe”. Another
outcome was the set-up of citizen consultations and online fora. In the following, a
brief overview of new research available on the citizen consultations and the online
consultations of the EC is given.1
Summarising research on the European Commission’s online consultations,
“Your voice in Europe”, Dieker and Galan (2014) conclude that although many
consultations are “open”, allowing any group to participate, the consultations—in
terms of the effects at the European public sphere—at best contribute to establishing
segmented and mainly expert public spheres. The consultations normally do not
attract interest from groups beyond those interest groups already represented in
Brussels. Due to the fact that participation in online consultations is resource-
consuming, it is mostly professional and well-organised groups that participate.
According to a study from 2011, business associations make up 39% of all partici-
pants in online consultations (Quittkat 2011, acc. to Dieker and Galan 2014). As
regards the potential to contribute to a more inclusive mode of policymaking and to a
European will-formation in the sense of (segmented) public spheres, the consult-
ations are perceived to suffer from shortcomings. The consultation process lacks
transparency with regard to clear information about the criteria for weighting
contributions and deciding on whether they are taken into consideration or not.
Contributions are not made accessible to participants and no exchange among
participants about contributions is possible. The purpose of the consultations is to
search for input to the policymaking process rather than public deliberation with or
among the groups contributing. However, the function of transmitting demands and
interests from civil society to the European institutions is regarded as being
restricted, since agenda-setting lies solely with the European Commission, which
decides about the issues that are made open for online consultation. Since online
consultations take place in highly segmented public spheres with mainly expert and
stakeholder communities participating, consultations are regarded as having a highly
professional character which does not allow them to take up a Europeanising
function in terms of active European citizenship (Dieker and Galan 2014, 245).
Between 2001 and 2010, 23 transnational citizen consultation projects supported
by the European Commission have been conducted, involving participants from a
minimum of three European countries. They included face-to-face meetings as well
as online discussions on specific issues, including the social and political impli-
cations of brain research as well as more general issues such as the European
1For more information on the EU’s online activities see Lindner et al. (2016) as well as Chap. 4 of
this report. For the “European Citizen Consultations”, the “Futurium platform” and the web portal
“Your voice in Europe”, see the case studies carried out as part of this report in Chap. 9.
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constitution and the future of Europe (Yang 2013: 25 f.). The six transnational
“Deliberative Citizens Involvement Projects” (DCIP) covered by the Plan D
programme involved approximately 40,000 people. The online project “Speak up
Europe” alone involved 300,000 users in discussions on European politics (Yang
2013: 27). An evaluation of these DCIPs with regard to their deliberative quality as
well as impact has been undertaken by contributions in Kies and Nanz (2013a). The
case studies presented support the notion that DCIPs have a “...potential to amelio-
rate the legitimacy of the EU and to promote a more substantial EU citizenship”
(Kies and Nanz 2013b: 10). The interactive aspect of deliberation is held to be a
feature that can support the experience of European citizenship. However, this study
also holds formats applied by the EU to function in a suboptimal way, such as “Your
voice in Europe”, which allow citizens to send comments to policymakers, since
they provide no space for deliberation and interaction among citizens on the issues
addressed (Smith 2013: 209). In the EC’s approaches to citizen participation, the
study found a tendency—mainly due to the lack of common language—to reduce the
role of citizens to posting statements or commenting on statements by policymakers,
rather than engaging in a European citizens’ debate and jointly working out policy
options to be forwarded to policymakers. Most disappointing, according to the
authors, was the lack of any follow-up activities or visible impact of the deliberative
experiments on policymaking (Smith 2013: 215; Kies et al. 2013: 74 f.). Friedrich
(2013: 44 ff.), discussing EU governance innovations, attests a strong bias to expert
involvement. The approaches for dialogue with CSOs failed to realise their potential
to strengthen the ties between EU authorities and European civil society or to support
the construction of a European demos, due to a lack of commitment and “discre-
tionary” patterns of participation. It is concluded that as long as a regulated integra-
tion of DCIPs in EU policymaking processes is not provided for and as long as
DCIPs are mainly held on broad topics such as the social and economic future of
Europe rather than on concrete challenges and the problems of decision-making,
there is a danger that they are increasingly perceived as being more of a promotional
instrument than serious attempts to engage the European citizenry in EU policy-
making (Kies and Nanz 2013b: 11 f.). According to this analysis the potential of
public consultations at the EU level to contribute to a lively European space of
debate about EU policy, which could contribute to a European public sphere,
appears to be restricted at this point.
The roles of segmented publics which are emerging around European issues, be it
via initiatives taken by the EU institutions or bottom-up by interest groups across the
borders of Member States, are regarded to have the potential to serve as nodes for a
European networked public sphere alongside mass media publics (see Lindner et al.
2016). Kriesi et al. (2010: 225) argue that due to their frequent cross-national
character, interest groups, and business and professional organisations (rather than
political parties) can be regarded as a “Europeanized type of political actor”. But
such organisations engaged in consultations with decision-makers can hardly be
regarded to be functioning as nodes of a political public sphere. Issue publics that are
exclusively “based on the horizontal intermediation between bureaucrats, experts
and organized interests fall way short of complying with democratic provisions of
3 E-Democracy and the European Public Sphere 79
openness and equal access” (Eriksen 2005, cit. Pfetsch and Heft 2015: 33; see also
Eriksen 2007 and Lindner et al. 2016), for which online consultations (see above)
provide an example. However, as far as such issue publics involve a broad range of
actors, or are organised bottom-up by civil society actors, they are held to be more
inclusive (in terms of reaching the average European citizen) than mass media
debates on European integration issues, that are often driven mainly by elites, with
the general public in the position of an observer in the gallery (Pfetsch and Heft
2015).
An analysis of the capacities of Internet-based issue publics created by networks
of civil society active in Fair Trade and Climate Change campaigning (Bennett et al.
2015), however, found sobering results regarding the capacity of such networks to
support the Europeanisation of publics. European-level networks for the issues of
Climate Change and Fair Trade identified by the study have been found to be weak
(compared to the connectivity of nationally based networks). The study found a
certain amount of “Europeanisation” as far as nation-based networks move into
networks active at the European level. But national networks mainly remain separate
from each other and from those networks organised around issue-related EU plat-
forms. It was also found that EU-platform-related issue networks of NGOs were able
to engage citizens with the issues at stake to a much lesser extent than their national
counterparts. The authors regard their findings as supporting the notion that “. . .civil
society organisations in the Brussels area often serve as substitutes for the voices of
European citizens, creating a civil order without credible levels of public engage-
ment, and thereby deepening the EU’s democratic deficit” (Bennett et al. 2015: 135).
Thus, it appears that the problem of segmentation in the sense of restriction of
publics to “epistemic communities” and experts (as addressed with regard to
European sub-publics organised around European issues and particular EU regu-
latory activities, Eriksen 2007; see Lindner et al. 2016) is not easily ruled out by
Internet-based networks organised by NGOs.
First results on the use of social media by interest groups active in EU lobbying
are available from a large European-funded project on the activity of EU lobbying
groups (www.intereuro.eu). Van der Graaf et al. (2016) revealed, based on a data set
of groups active in EU lobbying provided by this project, that when regarding the
scope and volume of social media use there is little evidence that social media use
was able to change inequalities in power and social representation at the EU level.
The study comprised around 500 interest groups with reported activity at the EU
level. “Range”was measured by the presence of interest groups on 11 selected social
media platforms, and “Volume” was measured by the activity of groups on Twitter
and Facebook. As regards the volume of social media use, small interest groups
(citizens, workers unions) prevail over internationally organised groups, as well as
big companies. However, when it comes to “range”, large organisations and firms
with big resources prevail. Thus, at least with regard to interest groups at the EU
level, social media appear not to provide for a level playing field for democratic will
formation. The authors conclude with regard to the “democratic effects” of the
“online world of interest representation”: “Rather than representing a new playing
field where pre-existing resource differences between groups play less of a role, our
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analysis underlines the importance of resources both when we consider the range
and volume of social media use” (van der Graaf et al. 2016: 122).
When analysing online comments of readers in political blogs, news platforms
and transnational websites in 12 European countries during the 2009 EP election
campaigns, de Wilde et al. (2014) found patterns of communication similar to those
in mass media communication in the blogosphere with regard to European issues.
The study found that diffuse Eurosceptic evaluations dominate public debates across
Member States. The majority of evaluations made, particularly those by citizens
leaving comments online, were Eurosceptic, constituting a gap between them and
political elites who intervened with EU-affirmative statements. More complex eval-
uations of EU politics on the side of citizens were missing. These diffuse negative
statements however were mainly about actual politics (complaining about the
democratic deficit) than against EU integration as such. All in all, the authors
conclude that there is “little evidence of the potential for legitimation through
politicization in online public spheres” (de Wilde et al. 2014: 779). However, the
study could not support the often-purported notion of a fragmentation of audiences
in online discourse: debates intensified with politicisation of the European integra-
tion issue, but pro and con arguments were related to each other. Less “ambivalent”
findings as regards the fragmentation of publics can be expected to apply for social
media communication in Eurosceptic and right-wing groups. The negative aspects of
social media communication as addressed in the previous section are no doubt
relevant for any attempt to appraise the Internet’s possible effects on the European
public sphere. As the prominent case of the activities of Cambridge Analytica (not
only in the US elections) show: micro-targeting obviously played a role in the British
referendum to leave the European Union. And social media is the central means of
right-wing populist movements across the Union to set up information echo-
chambers for their followers in order to provide information to counteract the
so-called mainstream media that are defamed as providing fake news. As not only
the case of Brexit shows, social media meanwhile is a means for politicians as well as
grass-roots campaigners to reach audiences directly and bypass the filters of mass
media journalism, to an extent that is about to dominate election campaigns (Enli
2017; Mair et al. 2017; Toepfl and Piwoni 2015). An analysis of Twitter communi-
cation during the Brexit referendum campaign found that Twitter users supporting
the Leave campaign were more active (they tweeted more frequently) than Remain
users and showed a strong tendency to interact only with like-minded persons
(Hänska and Bauchowitz 2017). Setting aside the unanswerable question of whether
or not social media campaigning and communication did decide the British referen-
dum on EU membership, social media are without doubt the media of choice for
activist groups and individuals challenging the mainstream, and not surprisingly, this
counts not only for democratic civil society organisations but also for populist
movements and campaigns.
In view of the phenomenon of the organised spreading of dis-information via
social media by using so-called social bots or by other means of campaigning, and
also with a view to the Cambridge Analytica case, the European Commission has set
up a High Level Expert Group on online dis-information to make suggestions on
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how to steer against these “post-truth” currents and provide for quality safeguarding
in Internet communication. The measures suggested range from increasing the
transparency of Internet platforms’ use of data for advertising purposes, to
establishing independent fact checkers in news media and safeguarding the diversity
of the European news media ecosystem. The observation the Expert Group starts
from, is to state the obvious downside to the structure of Internet communication that
originally gave rise to hopes for a more vivid public sphere: “an increasingly digital
environment gives European citizens many new ways of expressing themselves and
of finding and accessing diverse information and views. It also enables an increase
in the volume of various kinds of disinformation in circulation” (High Level Expert
Group 2018: 10).
3.5 Conclusion
3.5.1 The EU Democratic Deficit in Times of Crisis
It is quite clear that scholarly debate as well as research on the European public
sphere and on European citizenship and identification with Europe as a political
community has intensified over the past years, due to the symptoms of an actual
crisis of the EU institutions and the idea of European integration. It is still believed
by many that the perceived democratic deficit of the European Union indicates the
need for fostering a European public sphere as a space of debate across public
spheres which are established at (and restricted to) national Member States. More-
over, there is a consensus that the new modes of political communication via the
Internet have to play a role in that respect. However, far-reaching expectations and
optimism envisaging the Internet as a panacea to political disenchantment and as a
way to establish new transnational spaces of European bottom-up political commu-
nication are scarce compared to a decade ago.
As regards the state of the European political system, it is argued on the one hand
that precisely in times of crisis, it is necessary to legitimise far-reaching decisions
that will deeply influence living conditions in the European Member States. These
decisions are to be reached through a vivid process of deliberation about pro and
cons, about needs, demands and duties. On the other hand, there is pessimism
whether—in the actual crisis that leads to focusing on national interests—there is
enough homogeneity in the Union and strong identification with the EU as a
transnational political entity. It is the observation of weak European solidarity and
predominance of national perspectives that actually feeds the so-called “no demos”
discussion among scholars of European politics. The point of dissent here is whether
Europe is in need of the development of a transnational cultural identity (which is
held by many to be exclusively bound to the national state) or whether a political
identity—i.e. the European citizens’ commitment to the fundaments of the European
political constitution—is sufficient to establish a new form of “European citizen-
ship”. Proponents of a further integration of the EU base their cautionary optimism
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with regard to the “Europeanisation of European citizens” in the further development
of the discourse about Europe and thus in the further development of the European
public sphere. In this respect, the development of European identity and solidarity
depends on the chances and opportunities to discuss and define what is in the
common European interest via a common European political discourse. This
would include fostering the role of the European Parliament and a European cross-
national party system.
In this respect, what has been coined the “politicisation of Europe” in the actual
crisis is—despite the undeniable symptoms of a renationalisation of political dis-
course and EU-scepticism—regarded as offering the opportunity to strengthen
European identity. Since citizenship evolves in a political process of debate and
emerges precisely outside of debates and conflicts about the public good, the current
conflicts about EU policies and democratic legitimisation are regarded as a result of
stronger engagement of citizens with the idea of Europe. On the other hand, it is
evident that the crisis brings new forces and actors to the foreground that are not
supportive of European integration and offer views that focus on national interests
and thus help to strengthen national identities. There is, however, consensus that the
European public sphere has a strong bearing on the development of a European
identity as a space of debate where collective identities are constructed, and
political communities are created.
3.5.2 The Internet and the European Public Sphere
With regard to the state of research on the European public sphere it has been
critically stressed that so far, the focus of research has been on elite mass media
communication and that research has neglected the relevance of new Internet-based
communication networks mainly applied by civil society actors. In this respect some
change can be observed, as there is a growing interest in Internet-based political
communication and its potential for establishing new public spheres. However, a
decade ago optimism was widespread that, while we find a decline of national public
spheres with passive audiences and disenchantment with politics, the Internet could
support the emergence of a trans-national public sphere that is more inclusive,
deliberative and rooted in a transnational civil society. Such far-reaching expect-
ations are scarcely put forward nowadays. Political communication via social media
is currently in the focus of research, but it is difficult to draw clear conclusions with
regard to their role in supporting the emergence of a vivid political public sphere:
• Internet-based political communication is not likely to develop into a supra-
national public sphere, but rather establishes a network of a multitude of mediated
and unmediated discursive processes aimed at opinion formation at various levels
and on various issues.
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• It is a matter of contestation whether this multitude is able to bring about a
space of common (public) interests, or whether these dispersed spaces restrict
political communication to issue related or ideologically closed communities.
• Indications and arguments for both can be found: that social media can empower
underrepresented interests as well as that there are reasons to doubt that
social media would help to reduce inequalities in the political sphere.
• Online political communication has a potential to increase responsiveness of, and
exchange with, political representatives and their constituencies. However, so far
this potential is set into practice insufficiently. Online media are increasingly used
by political institutions in a vertical and scarcely in a horizontal or interactive
manner of communication.
Since the overall state of research on the empowering force of the Internet is still
insufficiently developed, the actual potential for the Internet to bring about a new
“public sphere” is impossible to assess. It can be summarised that there is an online
space for political communication with many new features and options that go
beyond or bypass mass media channels. It is, however, the subject of debate as to
what extent these features have the potential to democratise political communication
and public discourse.
It is held by many researchers that, in principle, the use of interactive tools of
e-participation at the European level can contribute to fostering the legitimacy of the
EU and to promote a more substantial EU citizenship. However, it is observed that
the role of citizens is often reduced to just posting statements or commenting on
statements by policymakers rather than engaging in a European citizens’ debate and
jointly working out policy options to be forwarded to policymakers. Also, the notion
put forward in our report to the European Parliament a decade ago (Lindner et al.
2016), that public spaces established by consultation processes offered by the
European institutions are often restricted to expert communities and at best help to
establish segmented issue-related elite publics on the European level, as confirmed
by recent research, is just about to emerge. First results of the research on the use of
social media and Internet sites by civil society organisations active on the European
level indicate that the restriction of publics at the European level to “epistemic
communities” and experts is not easily ruled out by Internet-based networks
organised by NGOs. Moreover, political communication via social media plays a
destructive role by supporting filter bubbles and dis-information. This is widely used
by anti-European populist movements all over Europe with, as is suggested by
research on the role of Internet communication in the British EU referendum on
the EU membership, significant detrimental effects to public deliberation.
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